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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
****** 
PRODUCERS LIVESTOCK MARKETING 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah cooperative 
association, 
Plaintiff - Respondent. 
vs. 
ZANE CHRISTENSON, 
Defendant - Appellant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
CASE NO. 15388 
Producers Livestock Marketing Association, plaintiff-appellee 
herein, pursuant to the terms of Rule 76(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, petitions the court for rehearing of the above matter. 
Plaintiff-appellee respectfully submits that the court erred in 
its decision filed on November 27, 1978 in the following particu-
lars: 
1. The decision herein that a joint venture continued 
between the parties is based on disputed facts not preponderating 
aga~nst the lower court's findings. Therefore, reversal would 
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be an inappropriate usurpation of the trial court's discretion. 
2. The record does not support a finding of joint venture 
ln the feeding of the cattle. 
3. The direction of the plurality opinion to adjust 
the loss between the parties cannot be followed because 
the record is unclear as to how apportionment is to be made. 
Respectfully submitted this /q~day of December, 1978. 
ARHSTRONG, RAWLINGS, WEST 
& SCHAERRER 
Ben E. Rawlings 
James R. Morgan 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
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CERTIFICATE 
True and correct copies of the Plaintiff-Appellee's 
Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing and Petition for 
Rehearing were hand delivered to 
this 
R. EARL OIL~~ and 
BRANT H. WALL 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
Suite 500 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ch ~day of December, 1978. 
I By~Yk~~ ames R. 1 u r 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PRODUCERS LIVESTOCK MARKETING 






CASE NO. 15388 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR RBHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, Producers Livestock Marketing Association, 
filed a tiVo-count complaint against the defendant, Zane Christen-
sen, to recover moneys paid to defendant on drafts drawn on 
plaintiff by defendant. Defendant answered t~e complaint ad-
mitting receipt of the money but, by way of counterclaim, sought 
a set-off and accounting on five specific business transactions. 
The case was tried in the District Court, sitting without 
a jury, and judgment was rendered to plaintiff on each count of 
the complaint. The trial court denied recovery on all counts of 
defendant's counterclaim except one, which is not before this 
court on appeal. Defendant apcealed. On November 27, 1978, 
this court, in a divided opinion, reversed the judgment on Count I 
of defendant's counterclaim, finding that the parties had been 
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joint venturers in a cattle purchase which resulted in a sub-
stantial loss and that plaintiff should share in the loss. 
The record herein reveals that olaintiff is a cooperat1 
livestock marketing association and that defendant, in additic· 
to being an extensive cattle owner and dealer, since 1948 had 
been associated with plaintiff i11 ::he purchase and sale of cat:. 
(TR 26-28; 122-125). That association included not only buy::.: 
and selling cattle to each other, or on a commission basis, k 
also joint venturing together on cattle transactions (TR26-23, 
122-125; 140-143). 
The subject of the counterclaim filed by defendant a~ 
the plurality's opinion 1vas the purchase of aporoximately 2W 
head of calves from the Ute Tribal Livestock Association in F 
In that transaction, a three-way partnership was formed betwee· 
plaintiff, defendant and a third party. The cattle were pure:· 
but due to the high purchase price and falling cattle market,: 
cattle could not be sold without sustaining a loss. Therefore 
the three-way partnership ended and Waitt Cattle Company pure:.• 
994 head reimbursing plaintiff a proportionate share of the~ 
chase price (TR 54; 279). Thereafter, the decision was rna~~· 
place the balance of the cattle in a feedlot in Delta, Utah. 
cattle were subsequently repurchased with a loss on the totai 
transaction of approximately $210,000.00 (TR 54-56, 61-62, 6> 
159-161). 
The trial court found that defendant acted alone in "1' 
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the cattle in a feedlot and therefore plaintiff was not liable 
for a partnership share of the loss sustained. The plurality 
opinion reverses the trial court's finding and in substitution 
thereof, finds inter alia that a joint venture continued between 
the parties and that plaintiff should share in the loss in the 
same prooortion that over the years the parties had split gains. 
Plaintiff-Appellee moves for rehearing, respectfully urging 
that the plurality opinion reversing the trial court's decision 
was in err because it is based upon disputed facts not clearly 
preponderating against the trial court's findings and therefore, 
a reversal would be an inappropriate usurpation of the trial 
court's discretion. Further, if the plurality opinion is left 
standing, it would create serious inconsistencies in the law of 
joint venture and of appellate review. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DECISION HEREIN THAT A JOINT VENTURE CONTINUED 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS BASED ON DISPUTED FACTS NOT 
PREPONDERATING AGAINST THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS. 
THEP£FORE, REVERSAL WOULD BE AN INAPPROPRIATE USURPA-
TION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION AND A REHEARING 
SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
Long standing legal precedence in this jurisdiction holds, 
in an equity case, that the trial court's findings will not be 
disturbed "unless as a matter of law. . . no one could reasonably 
find as did the fact finder." Canesecca vs. Canesecca, 572 P.2d 
708 (1977). The obvious reason for such precedence is the unique 
position of the trial court in hearing testimony and receiving 
-3-
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evidence. Nokes v. Continental Mining and Milling co., 6 u~-
2d 177, 178; 308 P.2d 954, 955 (1957). 
The majority opinion reverses the trial court based ~­
the oral testimony of the defendant and a witness, J. L. Line; 
(Lindsay) , whose testimony the trial court found to be unrel~ 
The record reveals many inconsistencies and bias lvhich suppor: 
the trial court's rulings. 
1. There is evidence that the witness, J. L. Linds~, 
was prejudiced against tl-Je plaintiff. The record reflects tk 
Lindsay was fired from plaintiff's employ because he would no: 
follow plaintiff's management directives (TR 220-224). That 
disregard for plaintiff's directives was clearly evidenced in 
Lindsay's failure to obtain management approval for feedlot 
operations and Lindsay's refusal to clean up cattle transactic· 
to avoid the very type of transaction at issue (TR 149-154, 2: 
224). It seems rather clear that if Lindsay disregarded his 
employer while employed, that he would be hostile to his emc: 
after being fired. 
2. There is evidence that the witness, J. L. Linds~, 
interested in the outcome of the litigation because of his cS 
ing business relationshiP with defendant. There is ample ev1:, 
in the record that Lindsay was interested in the outcome of~ 
litigation because he continues to do business with defen~m 
(TR 28, 103-104, 129, 138, 167-168). Lindsay and defendant~, 
fied that they had personal dealings as well as dealings thr:. 
-4-
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third party, Waitt Cattle Company. 
3. Lindsay's testimony was inconsistent and impeached 
on several points which were germane to defendant's theory of 
partnership. During cross-examination Lindsay displayed an in-
ability to recall S?ecifics of the cattle transaction in question 
or incredible inability to clarify deal sheets even though the 
record reveals that Lindsay supervised the deal sheet preparation 
(TR 128-130, 131, 152-154), the most significant of which was 
Lindsay's inability to identify the ultimate sale of the cattle 
to Wheatheart (TR 158-162). 
Lindsay's testimony was also clearly impeached on several 
specific points. Pressing Lindsay as to why the deal sheet in 
question did not reflect an ongoing transaction, Lindsay incred-
ibly explained that the deal had been "cleaned up" but that 
plaintiff would participate in the buy back (TR 130, 148-160). 
This testimony was directly in conflict with that of Joe Jacobs, 
general manager for plaintiff, who testified that a "cleaned up 
deal" meant that it was a totally completed transaction (TR 219-
220) • 
Similarly, Lindsay testified that there was an agreement 
with defendant to repurchase the subject calves but his statements 
to plaintiff's personnel were in direct conflict and impeached. 
Significantly, Lindsay's position reversed as soon as he was no 
longer employed by plaintiff but maintaining a business relation-
ship with defendant (TR 208-210). 
-5-
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In light of the foregoing, it cannot be said that the 
trial court's finding as a matter of law was so devoid of su":· 
that reasonable men could not have found as the trial court ~: 
and therefore, rehearino should be granted. 
II. THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF JOINT 
VENTURE IN THE FEEDING OF THE CATTLE AND THERE-
FORE REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
The majority opinion found as follows: 
"A joint venture should remain joint whether it 
results in a gain or in a loss, unless the parties 
otherwise contract. The record does not reveal 
any contract other than a joint venture."(Slip Op.4) 
This court in Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 19741, 
set forth the standard for a joint venture as follows: 
"The requirements for the (joint venture) relationship 
are not exactly defined, but certain elements are 
essential: The parties must coMbine their property, 
money, effects, skill, labor and knowledge. As a 
general rule, there must be a community of interest 
in the performance of the common purpose, a joint 
proprietary interest in the subject matter, a mutual 
right to control, a right to share in the profits and 
unless there is an agreement to the contrary a duty 
to share in any losses which may be sustained." Id. at: 
l. The defendant acted alone in placing the cattle i:1: 
feedlot. Clearly, at the point that the decision is made to::, 
the cattle in a feedlot, there is not evidence supporting a ::·. 
of joint venture. There is evidence and the trial court foo~­
partnership in the purchase. However, after the cattle were:: 
chased, it is clear that that partnership was terminated, 
Waitt Cattle Company ourchasing approximately one-half of t~e 
cattle. Significantly, impeaching testimon::· i:-1 t'1e record re"'' 
-6-
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that the one-half of the head purchased by Waitt was the plaintiff's 
half and the defendant took his share to a feedlot (TR 206-207). 
At that point there was not "a combination of property, money, 
effects, skill, labor and knowledge", because the record reflects 
that defendant acted along from that point as evidenced by the 
following facts: 
(a) Defendant alone contacted the operators of 
the feedlot and plaintiff was not represented during 
the negotiations. 
(b) The written feedlot agreement was between 
defendant and the feedlot operators, with no mention 
that plaintiff had an interest in the cattle. 
(c) Defendant arranged for and paid the freight 
on the calves to and from the feedlot out of his own 
funds. 
(d) Defendant arranged for and paid the balance 
of the purchase price on March 30, 1974 approximately 
two and one-half months before the transaction was 
actually completed. 
(e) Defendant comingled the calves with his own 
calves in the feedlot and maintained part of the calves 
on his own ranch even though the balance could have been 
liquidated through plaintiff's auction (TR 53-66, 110-
113, 238-245) 0 
Clearly, there was no combination of property, money, skill, labor 
-7-
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or knowledge in the transaction required in a joint venture ~ 
the trail court rightly held that defendant acted alone inc;, 
the cattle in a feedlot. 
2. There is evidence in the record of a contract of s; 
to defendant. The plurality opinion states that there is no; 
dence of any contract except a joint venture. HoHever, the ::. 
court noted with interest the 1972 Ute Indian deal wherein a 
portion of the calves purchased were placed in inventory and 
subsequently paid for by defendant •.vith no accounting for prc:.
1 
even though it had been a orofitable market (TR 274-278). I: 
also evident that the defendant J?Urchased cattle from plaint;: 
on his own account and that there was an ongoing customer re:; 
tionship between the parties as well as the partnership (TR 2' 
267-270, 272, 281). In light of the defendant' failure to ac:' 
for profits on the 1972 transaction, it becomes questionab~ 
whether defendant would have voluntarily reopened the "cleane: 
deal" had there been a orofit realized on the 1973 transacuc· 
Perhaps the most helpful testimony on plaintiff's leg;. 
responsibility to share in the loss was Lindsay's own testi~.c 
which, read in context, reveals that plaintiff's obligatioo~ 
more a moral than legal obligation when he stated in response 
the following question: 
Q. Now, it was your testimony that there would be a 
settlin~ up at some ooint because you wanted to 
help Zane recoup his losses, is that correct? 
-8-
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A. I said there would be a settling uo because I 
felt like we had participated in enough profit 
in all the other years and all other deals that 
we should participate in this one also. (TR 158) 
Because of defendant's own independent operation and the 
fact that he acted alone on all critical points of the feedlot 
phase of the transaction, a rehearing should be granted. 
III. THE DIRECTION OF THE PLURALITY TO ADJUST THE 
LOSS BETivEEN THE PARTIES CANNOT BE FOLLOWED 
BECAUSE THE RECO~D IS UNCLEAR AS TO HOI-l THE 
ADJUST}ffiNT IS TO BE MADE. 
1. The testimony is unclear as to how an adjustment for 
losses should be made. Testimony in the record is in conflict as 
to how the losses should be divided. Significantly, the testimony 
in conflict is between the two individuals upon which the plurality 
bases its opinion. Defendant testified that profits were divided 
approximately equally after taking out weighing charges, feed costs, 
freight charges, and that the decision was made between himself and 
Lindsay (TR 46-47, 94-95). However, Lindsay testified that all 
these factors, including interest costs, would enter into his 
decision on defendant's split and that on occasion defendant had 
nothing coming (TR 133, 135-136, 141-143, 163, 165). Of particular 
importance is the testimony of Lindsay concerning how they allocated 
losses. On this point Linday testified as follows: 
Q. Have you, in yo·1r ether course of dealings had 
any transactions that sustained a loss? 
A. Oh, yes. 
-9-
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Q. And what would happen in those instances? 
A. Well, sometimes we would pay and sometimes we 
would carry it on. We had 25 years of good 
business relationship and it wasn't too many 
times that we hadn't gotten even. 
Q. Were there many times that you had taken a loss 
of profits. 
A. Not too darn many. 
Q. And were there instances where you would carry 
them on for a period of time just as you were 
suggesting here? 
A. Yes, yes. 
Q. And work them out? 
A. Yes (TR 133). 
Thus, it is clear that the parties >vould attempt to rec: 
losses in subsequent transactions. A requirement that the tr: 
court apportion the losses cannot be done from the record beca. 
at least one year of transactions occurred between the partie; 
during which time much or all of the loss could have been equo. 
as evidenced by the Wheatheart transaction in the record wheri 
defendant received approximately all of the profit (TR 161). 
2. Any loss apportioned to plaintiff should be the~ 
incurred at the time the cattle 1vere Placed in a feedlot. ?:: 
tiff's position is that there should be no aoportionment of:· 
loss. However, because neither majority or minority opinio~s 
-1o-
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address this issue, the following should be submitted to assist 
the trial court in apportioning the loss. 
It is clear that defendant and Lindsay, in placing the 
cattle in the feedlot, were acting in direct contravention of 
management directives because no authorization was obtained for 
the feedlot operation and Lindsay was being pressured to clear 
off any inventory (TR 148-151, 211-215). It seems inconceivable 
that over the course of many years and thousands of transactions 
defendant would be unaware of those directives. 
If, however, defendant was unaware of the authorization 
requirement, Utah law would impute such knowledge to defendant. 
See: Section 48-1-9, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
During the course of the trial, plaintiff submitted evidence 
through its accountant that had the cattle been sold just after 
purchase, there would have been a loss sustained. By using the 
sale of a larger number of less desirable cattle approximately 
equal weights, the accountant computed that the loss which would 
have been sustained would have approximated $124,000.00 instead 
of the nearly $210,000.00 loss actually sustained (TR 283-289). 
Plaintiff submits that if the court is inclined to apportion 
loss, it should be that loss sustained when the three-way partner-
ship was terminated and not the loss incurred as a result of the 
feedlot operation over which it had no actual control. 
CONCLUSION 
The record contains disputed facts which do not clearly 
-11-
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preponderate against the trial court's findings, and there~n 
plaintiff res~ectfully urges that rehearing be granted. 
DATED this 18th day of December, 1978. 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS, \vEST & SCH;q 
By BEN E. RAWLINGS 
JAMES R. MORGAN 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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